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Shelton v. SaintAnthony's Medical Center1
The growing controversy over birth related rights, coupled with great
medical advances in pre-natal health care, has caused many plaintiffs to seek
recovery for birth related torts. A recent Missouri Supreme Court case2
allowed recovery for emotional distress in a birth-related malpractice action.
The case is noteworthy because Missouri has both case law3 and a statute4
proscribing so-called "wrongful birth" claims.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff in Shelton v. Saint Anthony's Medical Center gave birth to
a deformed child. She instituted a malpractice claim against the treating
physician and the independent radiology lab where she underwent tests. 5
On May 7, 1986 and September 11, 1986, the plaintiff, who was then
pregnant, underwent ultrasound tests at the offices of defendant South County
Radiologists, Inc. The defendants failed to accurately interpret the test results.
As a result, they did not inform plaintiff that her fetus had congenital
deformities and was developing without arms. 6

Plaintiff alleged that the

defendants failed to advise her of her options as to termination of her
pregnancy and that as a result of the negligence of the defendants, she was
denied her right to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.7

1. 781 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1989).
2. Id.
3. See Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893

(1988).
4. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130.2 (1986).
5. Id.
6. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 48.

7. Id.at 48-49. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of being denied the right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy, she incurred extraordinary medical expenses of

approximately $25,000 for medical care, treatment, special education, nursing care,
physical therapy, medication, special equipment and artificial limbs. Plaintiff also
alleged that she would incur similar expenses for the life of her daughter, loss of
consortium, loss of the right to lead a normal life, and that she has suffered and will
continue to suffer from emotional distress. Id. at 49.
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Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that the suit was barred by the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Kuenzi8 and by Missouri
Revised Statute section 188.130.2. The statute prohibits claims where the
plaintiff alleges that but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would
have chosen to abort the pregnancy. 9 The trial court granted the motion to
The Missouri Supreme
dismiss10 and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
original appeal.' The
as
an
the
cause
determined
and
transfer
Court granted
supreme court reversed and remanded the cause for reinstatement of the
petition. 3 The court held that since the mental distress the mother suffered
as a result of learning about her child's defect at birth instead of before birth
was attributable to the defendants regardless of whether plaintiff would have
claim and was not
had an abortion, the petition stated a valid malpractice
4
prohibited by Missouri statute or the Wilson decision.'
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. BriefDefinition of Birth Related Torts
Birth related torts have developed as a specialized branch of medical
malpractice. In general, courts recognize three distinct causes of action:
wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful conception (also called wrongful
fetal injury claims because the
pregnancy).'- All three actions differ from
6
provider did not directly injure the fetus-'

8. 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988).
9. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130.2 (1986). The statute provides that "[n]o person
shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on the claim
that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted." Id.
10. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 49.
11. Shelton v. Saint Anthony's Medical Center, No. 55030 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 24,
1989). The court affirmed the dismissal in accordance with Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.16(b)
without an extended written opinion.
12. Article V,§ 10 of the Missouri Constitution allows for the transfer of cases
from courts of appeals to the supreme court "because of the general interest or
importance of a question involved in the case, or for the purpose of re-examining the
existing law, or pursuant to supreme court rule." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10.
13. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 49.
14. Id. at 50.
15. Note, WrongfulBirthActions: The CaseAgainstLegislative Curtailment, 100
HARv. L. REv. 2017, 2017 n.4. (1987).
16. RESTATEMENT (SE6OND) OF TORTS § 869 (1977) requires that the wrongdoer
tortiously causes harm to an unborn child for the tortfeasor to be subject to inability
for fetal injury.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/14
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In a wrongful birth suit, the parents of a deformed child sue a health care

provider for failing to diagnose some deformity in the fetus 17 or failing to
inform the parents of risks threatening the fetus.18 The premise is that the
provider's negligence deprived the parents of the choice between carrying the
pregnancy to term or obtaining an abortion.' 9 Damages allowed typically
include the expenses of the ordinary and extraordinary medical care and
education of the deformed child, the expenses and pain and suffering of the
20
mother during pregnancy, and the emotional distress of the parents.
Currently, eighteen states recognize wrongful birth claims to some extent.2 '

17. Usually these cases involve genetic defects for which the provider either tests
for but fails to diagnose, see, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1984)
(physician negligently advised plaintiff that she was not a carrier of muscular
dystrophy; plaintiff subsequently had child affected with the disease), or fails to test
at the outset, see, e.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 254, 698 P.2d 315, 316 (1984)
(physician failed to test for rubella upon patient's request; child was born suffering
from congenital defects resulting from exposure to rubella in the womb).
18. Common cases are the provider's failure to test for Down's Syndrome through
amniocentesis when the mother is more than thirty-five-years-old or has a family
history of the disease. See Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D. S.C. 1983)
(child born with Down's Syndrome to mother who had positive family history of
Down's Syndrome; no amniocentesis done); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo.
1988) (en banc) (child born with Down's Syndrome to thirty-seven-year-old mother;
no amniocentesis done). Cases also include situations in which provider fails to
inform the mother about the effects of rubella during the early stages of pregnancy.
See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (child born with rubella
syndrome which caused eye lesions, heart disease and auditory defects because doctor
failed to diagnose mother's german measles).
19. See Note, supra note 15; Note, Legislative Prohibitionof Wrongful Birth
Actions, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1331 (1987).
20. Note, supra note 15, at 2017 n.4.
21. See Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988) (North Carolina
law); Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (Alabama law); Haymon
v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Siemieniec v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 512 N.E. 2d. 691 (1987); Pitre v. Opelousas
General Hosp., 517 So.2d 1019 (La. App. 1987) (parents still could recover for
expenses and for pain and suffering), aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, 530 So.2d 1151 (La.
1988); Proffit v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987); Smith v. Cote,
128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755
(1984); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa.
77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash
v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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A wrongful life cause of action is brought by or for the deformed"

child against the health care provider. The child also alleges that but for the
provider's negligence, the child would not have been born in the first place
to suffer the pain of the deformities.'
Only three jurisdictions currently
recognize this claim.' The courts usually deny the claim as a result of the
difficulty of ascertaining damages because the trier of fact, in determining
damages, would have to measure monetarily the difference between the child's
existence in an impaired state and non-existence. Tort damages are compensatory. They seek to put the plaintiff in the same state he or she would have
been in but for the defendant's negligence. 2 The New York Court of
Appeals stated the dilemma in Becker v. Schwartz:
Thus, the damages recoverable on behalf of an infant for wrongful life are
limited to that which is necessary to restore the infant to the position he or
she would have occupied were it not for the failure of the defendant to
render advice to the infant's parents in a nonnegligent manner.... Simply
put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for
wrongful life demands a calculation of damages upon a comparison between
the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state
and nonexistence. This
26
comparison the law is not equipped to make.

1985); Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
22. Healthy children have also sought recovery on a wrongful life theory. Courts
are reluctant to allow the claim. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190
N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (illegitimate child; wrongful life
action denied); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App, 1982) (child of large,
poor family; court held parents had a wrongful conception case, but child had no cause
for wrongful life). This Note will assume that the child was born with a deformity
when referring to a wrongful life claim.
23. Note, supra note 15, at 2017 n.4.
24. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982);
Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
25. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1984).
26. 46 N.Y.2d 401,411-12, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,900 (1978).
See also Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 I11.2d 482, 489, 499 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1986);
Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 363-64, 308 N.W.2d 209, 212 (1981);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967).
This characterization of the damages, however, may not be the correct one. From
the standpoint of fairness, the child should be compensated in some way for all of the
pain and suffering he or she would endure. Some compensation is better than none
at all; saying that damages are difficult to measure is not an excuse for failing to
award them.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/14
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Another reason some courts do not allow wrongful life claims is that
being born cannot constitute an injury.27 This reasoning goes hand in hand
with the inability to calculate damages, because if the court finds that being
born is indeed an injury, the trier of fact must calculate damages. In a
wrongful birth claim, by comparison, the child's birth is a legally cognizable
injury, 2s but the injury is to the parents, not the child; thus, damages are
calculable. 29
A wrongful conception/pregnancy cause of action arises when the mother
has a healthy child after a health care provider fails to successfully perform
sterilization on either parent, 30 the health-care provider fails to successfully
perform an abortion, 31 or the health-care provider prescribes a birth control
device that fails to prevent conception.32 The trend among state courts is to
allow a claim for wrongful conception/pregnancy. 33 In most cases, the courts
allow recovery for medical expenses, pain and suffering during the pregnancy,
and loss of consortium." In some cases, the courts direct that any damages
awarded be offset by the benefits of having a child.35

27. See Liniger v. Eisenbaum,.764 P.2d 1202, 1210 (Colo. 1988) ("[Al person's
existence, however handicapped it may be, does not constitute a legally cognizable
injury relative to non-existence.")
28. See Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 49.
29. See Liniger, 764 P.2d at 1207 n.8 for a discussion of damages awards in
wrongful birth cases.
30. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(plaintiff alleged physician negligently performed an operation removing a portion of
the fallopian tubes; plaintiff later conceived a child).
31. See Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986) (plaintiffs alleged
physician negligently performed unsuccessful abortion).
32. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (plaintiff
alleged that pharmacist negligently filled oral contraceptive prescription with
tranquilizers).
33. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d. 8 (Del.
1975); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872
(W.Va. 1985).
34. See supra notes 30-33 and cases cited therein.
35. See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 176; Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 254-55, 187
N.W.2d at 518. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) which
states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the interest
of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Some courts that do allow the parents to recover damages for emotional
distress in wrongful birth and wrongful conception/pregnancy cases also
impose the special benefits rule of section 920 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.36 Thus, any damages the parents recover must by offset by the
benefit of having a child, even if the child is deformed.37 Some courts have
criticized this application of the special benefits rule, arguing that section 920
applies only when the injury and benefits relate to the same interest; the

emotional benefits of rearing a child cannot offset the economic costs of the
child's deformities.38

B. Missouri Cases
The Missouri courts have considered several cases dealing with birth
related torts. These cases find their basis in the doctrine of informed consent,
articulated in Aiken v. Clary.39 In that case the court noted that the basic
argument in malpractice cases is that the doctor failed to adhere to a
reasonable standard of medical care and as a result the services performed by
the doctor were negligent.40 The court noted that the doctor could be
negligent not only where the alleged malpractice consists of improper care and
treatment, but also where "it is based, as here, on an alleged failure to inform
the patient sufficiently to enable him to make a judgment and give41an
informed consent if he concludes to accept the recommended treatment."

36. See cases cited in supra note 35.
37. See Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1319-20 (D. S.C. 1983) (in
wrongful birth case, only the damages attributable to emotional distress were reduced
by fifty percent; the benefits rule should not improperly restrict the scope of
permissible damages); University of Ariz. v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 584, 667
P.2d 1294, 1299 (1983) (in a wrongful pregnancy action, trier of fact may consider
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements of damages pertaining to rearing of the
child, but must also consider both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits which the
parents will receive from their relationship with the child as an offset); see also
Liniger, 764 P.2d at 1206 n.7 (discusses use of the special benefit rule in wrongful
birth and wrongful life cases); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 258-59, 698 P.2d 315,
320-21 (1984) (in a wrongful birth case, damages for expense of supporting the child
beyond the age of majority were allowed; damages for emotional injury were balanced
against the benefit of having the child).
38. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271,274, 425 N.E.2d 968,970
(1981) ("[R]ewards of parenthood should not be allowed in mitigation of rearing costs
because 'these rewards are emotional in nature and, great though they may be, do
nothing whatever to benefit the plaintiff's injured financial interest."').
39. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965)
40. Id. at 673.
41. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/14
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The first Missouri case directly dealing with wrongful birth and wrongful
life was Miller v. Duhart.42 In Miller, the plaintiffs sought damages for the
wrongful life or wrongful birth of a healthy child born after the allegedly
negligent performance of a bilateral tubal ligation.43 The court held that the
cause of action was really one of wrongful conception. 44 An action for
wrongful conception, said the court, is merely a descriptive name for a form
of malpractice, and malpractice claims have strong support in the law. 45
Wrongful conception, as a malpractice claim, gives rise to damages that are
measurable and compensatory such as prenatal and postnatal medical
expenses, the mother's pain and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, loss
of consortium, and the cost of a second sterilization procedure. 46
The court noted in discussing the alleged wrongful birth claim that the
child was born healthy. The court gave three reasons for not allowing the
wrongful life claim. First, recognizing the wrongful life claim would require
a finding that a child has a right not to be born. Such a finding would require
the judiciary to decide when a life is wrongful. Second, it is difficult to assess
damages in a wrongful life case. The court would have to measure the
difference between existence and non-existence, and the value of life versus
non-life is impossible to quantify. Third, the child has no cognizable injury,
because the child has no right to be born or not to be born into a family
which planned for or wanted the child.47
The wrongful birth claim was brought by the child's siblings. The court
said there was no basis in law for an action by siblings for the birth of an
additional child to their family. 48 As a result of this analysis, only the
wrongful conception claim stood.49

42. 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

43. Id. at 184.
44. Id. at 188. The court concluded that any injury the parents suffered was
suffered at the time of conception. The court noted that "causes of action involving
the alleged failure of a surgeon to competently perform a sterilization procedure are
more appropriately termed 'wrongful conception."' Id.
45. Id. This characterization is important because in Shelton, the court allowed
the action because the plaintiff plead the injuries and damages in malpractice terms.

It is unclear to the author how wrongful conception is considered malpractice and
wrongful birth is not. In both cases, there is negligence on the part of the health care
provider which causes an unwanted child to be born.
46. Id. In Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), the
Missouri Supreme Court allowed Miller to stand.
47. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 186-87.
48. Id. at 187.
49. Under the facts of the case, however, the suit was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for malpractice actions. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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The Missouri statute barring wrongful birth and wrongful life suits
became effective on August 13, 1986.50 A wrongful birth case, Rolf v.
Youngblood,5' was heard by the court of appeals in 1988. The court flatly
denied the cause of action, referring to the statute.52 The plaintiffs also
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court noted that it had no

jurisdiction in a matter challenging the validity of a Missouri statute. Also,
since no common law action for wrongful birth ever existed in Missouri, there
can be no abridgement of the cause of action by the statute; thus, the court
never reached the constitutionality of the statute.53
In Wilson v. Keunzi, 54 the Missouri Supreme Court held that even
though section 188.130 did not have retroactive application, the wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims would still be barred.55 In Wilson, the mother gave
birth to a child with Down's Syndrome. The mother was thirty-six years old
at the time of conception.
The defendant doctor neither told the parents about the chances of the
baby being born with a defect due to the mother's age nor about having an
amniocentesis test to detect any defects.56 The parents brought a wrongful
birth action, alleging "the mother was . .. denied the ability to make an
informed decision to abort the pregnancy, which she alleges she would have
done, had she been advised of the fact that the fetus was afflicted with the
disorder."5 7 The minor child also brought a wrongful life action. 8 The
Missouri statute barring wrongful birth and wrongful life claims became
effective in 1986, and the court held that the legislature did not intend for it
to have retroactive application.5 9 Thus, the court had to decide whether a
common law action for wrongful birth or wrongful life existed in Missouri
before the statute.6

50. See supra note 9 for text of the statute.
51. 753 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id.
54. 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988).
55. Id. at 746. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Wilson.
56. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 742. The court noted that the risk of Down's
Syndrome is approximately 1 in 1000 for women in their twenties, but that the risk
increases to approximately 1 in 300 for a women at age thirty-six. The court noted
.further that the defect can be detected through the amniocentesis test, which is
administered during or after the fourteenth week of pregnancy. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. The child was born on June 23, 1983. Id. at 741.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/14
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The supreme court upheld the dismissal of the wrongful life claim of the
child, "shar[ing] the view of the overwhelming majority of courts."61 In its
analysis of the parents' wrongful birth claim, the court relied heavily on the
New York decision in Becker v. Schwartz.62 The court ultimately found that
the wrongful birth action did not exist in Missouri prior to the enactment of
the statute. Judge Welliver, writing for the majority, was concerned that a
woman's testimony that she would have chosen an abortion had she known
about the defect is not verifiable. 63 Judge Blackmar, in his concurring
opinion, pointed out that the only damage the plaintiff claimed was that had
the plaintiff known about the defect, she would have had an abortion.
Blackmar agreed with the majority that the court "should not award damages
of the kind claimed."' Thus, Judges Welliver and Blackmar erected two
roadblocks to recovery in the Wilson case: first, proof of the harm must be
verifiable and not self-serving, and second, the recovery of damages must not
the
violate Missouri's policy against reproductive freedom. The court set 65
roadblocks.
these
avoid
to
managed
plaintiffs
the
where
stage for Shelton,
Finally, the Wilson court stated that since Missouri does not recognize a

wrongful life or wrongful birth cause of action at common law, there was no
need to address the constitutionality of section 188.130.66

61. Id. at 743.
62. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 417-22, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816-19, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 904-07

(1978). "The heart of the problem in these cases is that the physician cannot be said
to have caused the defect." Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Becker.
63. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 745-46. "In the wrongful birth action, the right to
recovery is based solely on the woman testifying, long after the fact and when it is in
her financial interest to do so, that she would have chosen to abort if the physician had
but told her of the [deformity]." Id.
64. Id. at 746 (Blackmar, J., concurring). It appears as if Judge Blackmar's main
concern is upholding Missouri's strong policy against abortion.
65. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
66. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746. The North Carolina Supreme Court also has
found wrongful birth actions to be proscribed under common law negligence theories.
See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 835 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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C. Impact of Statutes BarringBirth Related Claims
Six states, including Missouri, 67 have enacted statutes barring both
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.'
One commentator argues that
these statutes are the result of lobbying efforts by anti-abortion groups.6 9
Only one state, Maine, has enacted a statute specifically allowing wrongful
birth claims.70

67. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.130.1 (1986) provides in pertinent part, that "[n]o
person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of
himself or herself based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, he
or she would have been aborted." See supra note 9 for the text of § 188.130.2.
68. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1989); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 21-55-1 to -55-4 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987). The Idaho statute
is typical, stating, "A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be
awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission
of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would
have been aborted." IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990). Missouri's statute closely parallels
those statutes cited above. See supra notes 9, 67.
69. Note, supra note 15, at 2018-19. It is unfortunate that politicians, succumbing
to the pressure of special interest groups, have taken away a cause of action allowed
in eighteen other states. They seem to forget that abortion is still a legal choice for
women until the Supreme Court decides otherwise.
70. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (1990) provides:
(1) Intent. It is the intent of the Legislature that the birth of a normal,
healthy child does not constitute a legally recognizable injury and that it is
contrary to public policy to award damages for the birth or rearing of a
healthy child.
(2) Birth of healthy child; claim for damages prohibited. No person
may maintain a claim for relief or receive an award for damages based on
the claim that the birth and rearing of a healthy child resulted in damages
to him. A person may maintain a claim for relief based on a failed
sterilization procedure resulting in the birth of a healthy child and receive
an award of damages for the hospital and medical expenses incurred for the
sterilization procedures and pregnancy, the pain and suffering connected
with the pregnancy and the loss of earnings by the mother during pregnancy.
(3) Birth of an unhealthy child; damages limited. Damages for the
birth of an unhealthy child born as the result of professional negligence
shall be limited to damages associated with the disease, defect or handicap
suffered by the child.
(4) Other causes of action. This section shall not preclude causes of
action based on claims that, but for a wrongful act or omission, maternal
death or injury would not have occurred or handicap, disease, defect or
deficiency of an individual prior to birth would have been prevented,cured
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/14
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The Minnesota statute 7' was the first statute to survive constitutional

challenge. It was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc.72 The court held that the due process and equal

protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because there
was no state action. 73 The court further stated that even if there was
sufficient state action, the statute did not violate Roe v. Wade.74 To violate

Roe, the state must impose a significant burden on a woman's right to an
abortion.7' Section 145.424 did not interfere with the mother's right to
choose an abortion; the doctor and the patient were left free to choose

whatever course of action they thought appropriate. 76 Finally, the court held
that subdivision three of the statute,77 which allows wrongful conception
claims, did not violate the equal protection clause because no suspect
classification was involved.7
Hickman was an early case where a wrongful birth statute received
constitutional scrutiny. Missouri held in Wilson v. Keunzi 79 that wrongful
birth and wrongful life claims did not exist at common law, even before the

or ameliorated in a manner that preserved the health and life of the affected
individual.
71. MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1990) states:
Subdivision 1. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that
but or the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Subd. 2. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall maintain
a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for
the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Subd. 3. Failure or refusal to prevent a live birth. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for intentional or
negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the failure
of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim that, but
for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been
provided or would have made properly which would have made possible the
prevention, cure or amelioration of any disease, defect, deficiency, or
handicap. The failure or refusal of any person to perform or have an
abortion shall not be a defense in any action, nor shall that failure or refusal
be considered in awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any action.
72. 396 N.W.2d 10, 13-15 (Minn. 1986).
73. Id. at 13.
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
76. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14.
77. See supra note 71.
78. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14.
79. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d 741.
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statute was enacted. Thus, the Wilson court avoided constitutional scrutiny of
the Missouri statute.80 Commentators have noted, however, that similar
statutes in other states that did allow common law actions would not survive
constitutional scrutiny.8' The passage of more statutes barring wrongful life
and wrongful birth claims would significantly restrict plaintiffs' ability to
recover for birth related torts; plaintiffs could only recover under the
traditional confines of the malpractice claim.
III. THE DECISION IN
SHELTON V. SAINT ANTHONY'S MEDICAL CENTER

In the instant case, the court found that the plaintiff's claim was not be
precluded by the Missouri statute or by the decision in Wilson v. Kuenzi. The
plaintiff in Shelton sought damages which could be separated from damages
arising from the possibility that, but for the defendants' negligence, the child
would have been aborted.82 Also, the plaintiff claimed damages for mental
distress. The court found, as a result of these two facts, that the harm to the
plaintiff was attributable to the defendants regardless of whether the plaintiff
would have had an abortion. 3
The majority distinguished Shelton from Wilson v. Kuenzi. In Wilson, a
plurality opinion struck down a cause of action brought for wrongful birth.
The court defined wrongful birth as an action "brought by one or both of the
parents of a child born as a result of some form of negligence by the
defendant." 85 The court noted that in Wilson, the only damage claimed was
that the plaintiff would have aborted the pregnancy had an amniocentesis been
performed indicating that her child had abnormalities.8 The court refused
to allow the recovery of damages for that claim; however, the court noted that
the petition would have plead an adequate claim for medical malpractice if the

80. Id. at 746. Note that the court allowed the petition in Shelton only insofar as
it stated a normal malpractice claim.
81. See Note, supra note 15, at 2023-34 (arguing that the statutes violate due
process and equal protection); Note, supra note 19, at 1351 (arguing that even though
the statutes do not violate a woman's constitutional right of privacy under Roe v.
Wade, wrongful birth and wrongful life actions should still be allowed).
82. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d 48, 50.

83. Id.
84. Judge Welliver wrote the opinion; Judges Blackmar, Robertson and Donnelly
concurred in separate opinions. Judges Higgins, Billings and Rendlen dissented.
Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746.

85. Id. at 743.
86. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 49.
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element of damages had "adequately appeared."87 Judge Blackmar switched
to the majority in Shelton because the' damages allowed were not related to
abortion, his main concern in the Wilson case.' The three dissenters in
Wilson, plus Blackmar's concurrence, comprise the majority in Shelton.
The Wilson court declined retroactive application of section 188.130.2,
which became effective on Aug. 13, 1986.9 In the instant case, since the
statute became effective during the pregnancy of the plaintiff, the court had
to determine first when the plaintiff's action accrued in order to determine
whether the statute applied. 90 The court noted that a cause of action accrues
at the time the plaintiff has a present right to maintain an action. 9' The court
found that in this case, the harm did not exist until the child was born; thus,
the plaintiff could not institute suit until her child was born. Birth was the
point of reference. Since the statute was in effect at the time of birth, any part
of the plaintiff's claim which fell within the statute's provisions would be
barred.

The court next examined the extent to which the statute served as a bar
to the plaintiff's claim. The court noted that in ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff's petition must be liberally construed. 93 The court held that the
plaintiff's petition stated a viable malpractice claim and should be reinstated
to the extent that it plead malpractice.94 The claim fell within the rule of
Aiken v. Clary,95 noted by Judge Higgins in his dissent to Wilson: "a doctor
who fails to adhere to the standard of reasonable care is guilty of malpractice
whether consisting of improper care and treatment or of failure to inform
sufficiently to enable the patient to make a judgment and give informed
96
consent with respect to treatment."
In the instant case, the petition alleged a breach of the duty to inform the
patient sufficiently for her to make a judgment about her pregnancy. It also

87. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746.
88. Id. (Blackmar, J. concurring).
89. Id. at 742.
90. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 49.

91. Id. (quoting Brinkman v. Common School Dist. # 27, 238 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1951)).
92. Id.

93. Id ("If the facts pleaded and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
looked at most favorably from the plaintiff's standpoint show any ground upon which
relief may be granted, the plaintiff has the right to proceed.") (quoting Laclede Gas Co.
v. Hampton Speedway Co., 520 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
94. Id. at 49.
95. 396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965).

96. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 748.
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alleged damages flowing from that breach. The plaintiff alleged mental
distress and counsel asserted at oral argument98 that the mental distress
resulted from the shock of finding out about the deformities of the child at
birth without adequate information of the defects before birth. Had she known
earlier, she could have obtained counseling on how to deal with the defects.
These damages, according to the court, are readily separable from damages
arising from the possibility that, but for the negligent conduct of the
defendants, the child would have been aborted. 99 In the court's view, the
mental distress resulting from the defendants' conduct is a harm attributable
to the defendants' negligence regardless of whether plaintiff would have
chosen to have an abortion. Thus, the pleading stated a malpractice claim
outside the provisions of section 188.130 because the damages were
distinguishable from those claimed in Wilson v. Kuenzi."1°
The court
concluded that under a liberal construction of the petition, the claims of loss
of consortium and loss of the right to lead a normal life may also be
interpreted to allege damage occurring after the birth of the child, as a result
of defendants' failure to inform. To that extent, the damages also would not
be barred by either the statute or by Wilson.'0
Three judges dissented in Shelton. In short, the dissent stated that the
petition clearly claimed the prohibited argument that but for the negligence of
the doctors, the plaintiff was denied the right to choose to abort her child. 10 2
The dissent noted that absent the implication that she would have chosen to
abort, the plaintiff did not allege any damages had the ultrasound images been
accurately read. 0 3 In short, the dissent held that the plaintiff's petition
alleged a claim for damages "all of which flow from the allegation that, but
for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted." Judge
Covington, for the dissenters, voiced concern that the plaintiff first alleged at
oral argument that she would have obtained counseling had she been advised
of the child's deformities prior to birth. Her petition did not allege this

97. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 50.
98. The fact counsel asserted this type of mental distress only at oral argument
and not in the petition is a fact that bothered the dissent. See id. at 51. (Covington,
J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 50.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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damage; it alleged only the abortion related damages. 1 4 As a result, the
plaintiff's claim should be barred by the statute. 0 5
IV. COMMENT
Shelton v. Saint Anthony's Medical Center is a significant case in

Missouri because it allows some recovery for a birth related tort. The key

difference between the damages allowed in Shelton and those prohibited by
Wilson v. Kuenzi and by the statute is that in Shelton, the mother would have

suffered the emotional distress whether or not she chose abortion. If Julia
Shelton were adamantly opposed to abortion, she still would have suffered
emotional distress at the time of birth when she discovered the defects. In
Wilson, the damages alleged resulted from the fact that the mother was denied
enough information to choose an abortion. If the mother in Wilson were
adamantly opposed to abortion and chose to have the deformed child, she
would have willingly borne the expenses and the emotional distress of the
pregnancy and for the birth and education of the deformed child; the court
would not have awarded her damages for these things. The mother in Shelton
was not awarded damages for any of these things either. She only got a small
piece of all the possible damages for the emotional distress she suffered
because she was not informed of her child's defects in time to prepare
mentally to deal with them. At this writing, Missouri is the only state to
award this "piece" of the damages in a wrongful birth type case. Certainly,
none of the other states with statutes similar to section 188.130.2 allow such
a recovery.
The court in Wilson articulated two major policy reasons for not allowing
the cause of action. Judge Welliver, writing for the majority in Wilson, had
the self-serving proof problem as a major concern.' 6 He felt a mother
could always allege that she would have had an abortion if she had known of
her child's defects; there is really no way to prove whether she would or
would not have chosen abortion in that context. Judge Blackmar articulated
the other important policy for barring the claim in his concurring opinion in
Wilson. He was concerned that awarding damages for a wrongful birth claim
would violate Missouri's policy against abortion. 7 The damages awarded

in Shelton avoided these two pitfalls because the harm existed regardless of

104. Id. at 51-52 (Covington, J., dissenting). Perhaps Judge Covington would

have allowed the damages awarded in Shelton if they had been pleaded properly in the
petition.
105. Id. at 52.
106. See Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746.
107. Id.
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whether the mother would have had an abortion. The damages did not hinge
on the abortion decision.
The only problem with the damage award in Shelton was that the plaintiff
asserted in her petition that if she had known about the defects, she would
have had an abortion. Thus, even though the damages she actually received
were not contingent on whether she would have had an abortion, all of the
other damages she plead were contingent on her having an abortion. They
would be disallowed by Wilson and the statute. The plaintiff was trying to
have it both ways, and the dissent was justly concerned about this issue."
The ideal plaintiff here would be one who vehemently opposed abortion and
would have had the child even if she had known about the defects. Such a
plaintiff could then allege that the health care provider's negligent failure to
accurately read the ultrasound and to inform her in advance of the defects was
the cause of emotional distress. This claim would not run afoul of Wilson and
the statute. It would be, in effect, a normal malpractice claim. What seems
to have happened in Shelton was that the plaintiff, having lost all the damage
claims resulting from denial of an informed choice of abortion, won back a
small amount of damages on the emotional distress claim at oral argument.
Shelton allows damage recoveries for emotional distress suffered at the
time of birth when the health care provider fails to diagnose defects in the
child and fails to inform the mother about them. The next question would be
whether there are any other non-abortion related damages in a wrongful birth
action. Since the pregnant mother plans to have the child, she must point to
harms suffered because she did not know about the defect until birth. Any
damages for the pregnancy itself, such as pain and suffering, lost wages and
loss of consortium, would not be recoverable, because any pregnant woman
suffers these harms. One instance where damages could be recoverable under
Wilson and the statute would be when the fetus could be treated in utero.
There, failure to diagnose and treat the fetus would be a non-abortion related
malpractice claim; however, this claim may accrue to the child, not the
mother.
In Shelton, the court allowed recovery once the harm was phrased to
avoid the two policy problems noted in Wilson. That case, coupled with the
statute, prevents most of the recovery for the claim in a tort system whose
purpose is to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries. Clearly, the plaintiff in
Shelton was not fully compensated for all the expenses and harm she incurred
as a result of the defendants' failure to accurately read the ultrasound. Thus,
one must question whether the decision in Shelton furthers basic tort policies.
One may conclude that it does not for several reasons.
First, the decision in Shelton represents an incorrect allocation of the
burdens. The health care provider did not directly cause the harm to the child,

108. See Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 51-52 (Covington, J., dissenting).
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but her negligence caused harm to the family as a whole. The parents, on the
other hand, were wholly innocent. In addition, health care providers are
highly educated professionals. In allocating the expenses for raising and
educating the deformed child, it is appropriate to hold the health care
professional responsible when the parents were robbed of their decision to
continue the pregnancy. This allocation is even more appropriate in cases
where the parents are ignorant, indigent or simply have no health insurance.
The health care provider was negligent, and the plaintiff should not have to
bear the costs of this negligence.
Second, not allowing full recovery does nothing to deter future negligence or to increase safety. The basic problem here was that the health care
provider did not accurately read the ultrasound. If the health care provider
had to pay a large jury award or settlement, the provider would arguably
exercise more care to avoid future litigation. The current law sends a signal
that the health care provider may get away with providing negligent care
because the plaintiff, in most birth related cases, will not be allowed to plead
a case. If the plaintiff can plead her case within Missouri's policy confines,
the possible damage award will be much smaller; one wonders whether the
emotional distress claim allowed in Shelton would be large enough to justify
litigating in the first place.
Finally, the decision in Shelton illustrates yet another example of politics
invading the tort system and narrowing the remedies available to plaintiffs.
The statute and case law preceding and including Shelton are another way in

which Missouri politicians have successfully restricted reproductive freedoms
without attacking the Roe decision head-on. This line of law may not be

enough of a restriction to impair access to abortion under current Supreme
Court analysis; however, it does demonstrate how reproductive rights may be
narrowed by addressing other situations connected to the abortion procedure.
SHARI S. WEINMAN
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